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Abstract
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting Random Sampling Optimal Price auction
(RSOP) has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright; this leads to a truthful mechanism. Since
random sampling is a popular approach for auctions that aims to maximize the seller's revenue, this
method has been analyzed further by Feige, Flaxman, Hartline and Kleinberg, who have shown that it
is 15-competitive in the worst case { which is substantially better than the previously proved bounds
but still far from the conjectured competitive ratio of 4. In this paper, we prove that RSOP is indeed
4-competitive for a large class of instances in which the number  of bidders receiving the item at the
optimal uniform price, is at least 6. We also show that it is 4:68 competitive for the small class of
remaining instances thus leaving a negligible gap between the lower and upper bound. Furthermore, we
develop a robust version of RSOP { one in which the seller's revenue is, with high probability, not much
below its mean { when the above parameter  grows large. We employ a mix of probabilistic techniques
and dynamic programming to compute these bounds.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work in algorithmic mechanism design. One of
the primary constraints that much of this work tries to enforce is incentive compatibility, which means that
being truthful is the best for each agent. In this work, we study a popular random-sampling-based incentive-
compatible mechanism (\RSOP") for auctions of digital goods where we aim to maximize the auctioneer's
expected revenue; we prove by a mix of analytical methods and computing-based approaches (the latter
based on rigorous mathematical arguments) that this mechanism has a much better competitive ratio than
was known before, and place limits on how good this mechanism can be in the worst case. Further, RSOP
as dened, has a non-negligible probability of delivering a very low revenue to the auctioneer: we develop a
more robust version which inherits the good properties of RSOP, and will additionally return a good-quality
solution with high probability (and not just in expectation) as the number of winning bidders in an optimal
solution grows.
Our basic problem is as follows. A seller (also referred to as auctioneer) has a good that she/he can make
an unlimited number of copies of { such as a digital good. We also have N bidders with unknown valuations
v1;v2;:::;vN for the good; this means that bidder i will buy the good i it is oered at a price of at most
vi to him/her. We aim to design a (randomized) incentive-compatible mechanism that will maximize the
seller's expected total revenue. We assume that the seller can make up to N copies if necessary at negligible
cost, so that the seller's revenue equals her/his prot. 1. A classical work of Myerson has studied this
problem under the Bayesian setting, where we assume a distribution on the bids vi; knowledge of the prior
information about the bid distribution is essential to his work [11]. Here, we will work throughout with
the classical \computer science" approach to this problem, which is to assume the worst case: this is the
\prior-free" variant of our problem where we allow an arbitrary (unknown and worst-case) distribution of
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1In case of a constant cost per copy, we can simply subtract the cost from every bid
1the bids. In the spirit of the competitive analysis of online algorithms, this naturally leads to the following
notion of competitive ratio. Note that if the bids v1  v2    vN are known in an instance I, then
revenue-maximization is trivial: letting  = argmaxi2 i  vi, we sell the good at price v, to get an optimal
revenue OPT(I) =   v.2 The competitive ratio of an incentive-compatible mechanism is dened to be
the largest possible value, taken over all possible instances I, of OPT(I) divided by the expected revenue
obtained by our mechanism on I. Note that this ratio is at least 1.
The prior-free variant of our problem has been rst investigated in [6, 5]. Random sampling is one of the
most natural methods that is used in prior-free settings when the objective is to maximize the auctioneer's
revenue. The work of [6] develops a natural random-sampling-based approach for our problem, Random
Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP). In RSOP, bidders are partitioned into two groups uniformly at random
and the optimal price of each set is oered to the other set. It has been shown that RSOP returns a revenue
very close to optimal for many classes of interesting inputs ([12], [1]). There has also been a fair amount of
work analyzing the competitive ratio of RSOP. In [5], Goldberg et al. showed that the competitive ratio of
RSOP is no worse than 7600, and conjectured that the competitive ratio should be 4; note that this cannot
be improved further since RSOP attains a competitive ratio for the instance with 2 buyer having valuations
v1 = 2v2. Later, Feige et al. improved the analysis and showed that this ratio is at most 15 [3]. There are
at least two reasons for trying to prove that RSOP's competitive ratio is 4. First, RSOP is very natural
and giving a tight analysis appears to be of inherent interest. Second, RSOP is very easily implementable
and hence easily adaptible to dierent settings (e.g., double auctions [2], online limited-supply auctions [8],
combinatorial auctions [1], [5], and the \money burning" problem [9]).
Summary of our results: To describe our results, we will need the notion of \winners" (w.r.t. the optimal
single-price auction). In our denition of OPT(I) where we set  = argmaxi2 i  vi, let  be the largest
index that satises this denition. Recall that in the \oine" case where we know all the vi and compute 
as this maximizing index, we sell at the single price v, which is then bought by bidders 1;2;:::; to give
an optimal revenue OPT(I) =   v to the auctioneer. Since the number of bidders who get the good in
this case is , we refer to  as the number of \winners" (w.r.t. the optimal single-price auction). Note that
 is determined uniquely by the values v1  v2    vN.
Many of our results are motivated by the following question: the instance seen above where n =  = 2
and the competitive ratio of RSOP is 4, seems quite unique. In particular, when selling a digital good, one
expects the typical number of buyers to be \large". Does RSOP do much better than known before, when
 is large? Our main results are four-fold as follows, and are obtained by an improved probabilistic analysis
aided by a dynamic programming computation and correlation inequalities:
I. Improved lower bounds: We prove that in expectation RSOP achieves:
 at least 1=4:68 of the optimal single price revenue, improving the lower-bound of 1=15 by Feige et
al. [3];
 at least 1=4 of the optimal single price revenue if  , the number of winners, is at least 6;
 at least 1=3:3 of the optimal single price revenue as  ! 1.
These results indicate that RSOP does better than known in the practically-interesting case where  is
\large", and that perhaps the only case where the competitive ratio of 4 is attained is the case where
 = 2 and v1 = 2v2.
II. Upper bounds: We prove that even if  gets arbitrarily large, one can construct an instance with
such , for RSOP obtains less than 1=2:65 of the optimal single price revenue in expectation.
III. Combinatorial approach: We also present a combinatorial approach for the case where the bid
values are chosen from two possible values and show that RSOP achieves 1=4 of the optimal single
price revenue in expectation in this case.
IV. Robustness: The competitive ratio is the expected value for a maximization problem, which in general
is not a suciently-good indicator of usability: a non-negative random variable with a \large" mean can
2There is a subtlety here that requires   2 in the denition of OPT(I), an issue that we will discuss later.
2still be very small with high probability. (This is in contrast with upper-bounds on the expectation for
minimization problems with non-negative objectives, where Markov's inequality bounds the probability
of the objective becoming prohibitively high.) Indeed, RSOP inevitably has a non-negligible probability
of returning zero revenue, in cases where  is small. Since the case of \large"  is a very natural one,
we could ask: is RSOP \robust" { the revenue does not deviate much below the mean { with high
probability when  is large? It can be shown that this is not always the case. Therefore, we develop
a new incentive-compatible mechanism RSOProbust(;) parameterized by ; 2 (0;1), which has the
following two properties: (i) for any input instance, the expected revenue is at least one-tenth the
optimal revenue for  small enough (say,   0:1); (ii) there is a value 0(;) such that for any input
instance with   0, the revenue is at least (1=4   ) times the optimal revenue, with probability at
least 1 . Note that this protocol does not require any information about the input instance (such as
the value of ), and delivers a good solution with high probability for the practically-interesting case
of large .
2 Problem Denition
We consider auctioning digital goods to N bidders with bid values v1;v2;:::;vN. Without loss of generality,
we assume v1  v2    vN. The Random Sampling Optimal Price auction partitions the bids into two
sets A and B such that each bid vi independently goes to either of A or B with probability 1=2. We then
compute the optimal price of each set (among the two sets A and B) and oer it to the other set: note that
the optimal price of a sequence G = hu1  u2    uki of bids in nondecreasing order, is uG where
G = argmaxi1 iui. (Thus, we will use this denition once with G = A when we compute the optimal price
for A and oer that price to B, and will use this denition again with G = B when we compute the optimal
price for B and oer that price to A.) For our input instance I = v1;v2;:::;vN of bids, we dene the optimal
revenue of I as OPT(I) = v where  = argmaxi2 ivi. Note that we force   2 here: without this, it can
be shown that no incentive compatible mechanism can achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in
the case where v1  v2 [7]. (Note that G above is allowed to be one; it is only the  that we use in the
denition of OPT(I) that is required to be at least two, in order to disallow negative results [7].)
3 Assumptions
To simplify the proofs we make the following assumptions throughout the rest of this paper.
 WLOG, we assume we have an innite number of bids v1;v2; in which all the bids after vN are zero
so our analysis will be independent of N.
 WLOG, to simplify the analysis, we assume that OPT(I) = 1 since we can always scale all the bids
by a constant factor without aecting the mechanism.
 For the sake of notation we use E[RSOP] to denote the expected revenue of RSOP on an input
instance where the expectation is taken over random partitions of the bids. Note that by our previous
assumption that OPT = 1 we have E[RSOP]  1 and the competitive ratio of RSOP can be dened
as maxI
1
E[RSOP(I)].
 WLOG, we assume that v1 is always in set B since the mechanism is symmetric for both A and B and
so we can relabel the sets.
 WLOG, we only consider the revenue obtained from B by oering the optimal price of A and we
assume the obtained revenue from A when oered the optimal price of B is 0. The justication for
this assumption is that we are computing the E[RSOP] for the worst case input. Note that for any
given input instance we can replace v1 with a very large bid such that the optimal price of set B is v1
in which case by oering price of v1 to set A we don't obtain any revenue.
34 The Basic Lower Bound
In this section, we give a basic lower bound that shows RSOP is indeed 4-competitive for a large class of
input instances. In the next section, we improve this result using a more sophisticated lower bound, but
based on the same idea. We start by stating the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 4.1. For any input instance I = fv1;v2;g where there are more than 10 bids above the optimal
uniform price (i.e.  > 10), the expected revenue of RSOP is at least 1
4 (i.e., E[RSOP]  1
4). The actual
computed lower bound values can be found in Table 1.
We prove the theorem throughout the rest of this section. The outline of the proof is as follows. First,
we dene a lower bounding function (LBF) which, for each partition of bids to two sets (A;B), returns a
value which is less than or equal to the revenue of RSOP. Most importantly, our LBF only depends on  and
on how the bids are partitioned but is independent of the actual value of the bids v1;v2;. The expected
value of the LBF is clearly a lower bound for E[RSOP]. After dening the LBF function, in Subsection 4.1,
we explain how we can compute the expected value of the LBF for any given . We then compute the LBF
for all values of  from 10 up to 5000 and show that the expected value of LBF is indeed greater than 1
4
and so is E[RSOP] for all  2 [10;5000]. The computation of the lower bound involves a combination of
probabilistic techniques and dynamic programming. Later, in Subsection 4.2, we compute a lower bound on
the expected value of the LBF assuming that  > 5000 and show that it is indeed greater than 1
4 and that
completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Before we start with the proof, let us make the following observations which gives an intuition to our
proof:
Observation 4.2. For a given i, roughly, we expect about half of v1; ;vi to fall in set A and the other
half to fall in set B. In other words, let si = #fjjj  i;vj 2 Ag, we expect si  i
2.
Observation 4.3. The optimal revenue of set A is at least as much as the revenue that we get if we oer
v to A. Let A be the index of optimal price in A. The optimal revenue of set A is at least sv. Since we
assumed v = OPT = 1, essentially v = 1
 and therefore we can use s
 as a lower bound on the optimal
revenue of set A. Formally, assuming Prof(A;vA) denotes the revenue that we get from a set A by oering
the price vA to it:
Prof(A;vA) 
s

(4.1)
Note that based on Observation 4.2 we expect this quantity to be about 1
2.
Observation 4.4. Dene zi = i si
si which is the ratio of the number of bids from v1; ;vi that fall in B
to the number of those that fall in A. It is easy to see that the ratio of revenue of set B when oered vA to
revenue of set A when oered the same vA is the same as zA. Formally:
Prof(B;vA)
Prof(A;vA)
= zA (4.2)
Notice that A depends on the actual value of the bids and thus (4.2) is hard to work with. To work
around that, we use z = mini zi as a lower bound for zA. Therefore:
Prof(B;vA)
Prof(A;vA)
 z (4.3)
The outline of the proof of our basic lower bound for E[RSOP] is as follows. We combine Observation 4.3
and Observation 4.4 to get the following:
4E[RSOP]  E[Prof(B;vA)] (4.4)
 E[Prof(A;vA)
Prof(B;vA)
Prof(A;vA)
] (4.5)
 E[
s

z] (4.6)
Note that (4.6) allows us to compute the lower bound regardless of the actual values of vi because the
right hand side of (4.6) is totally independent of the vi values except for . Also note that for any given
input instance I,  depends only on I and not on how we partition the bids so in computing E[RSOP],  is
a constant (for a xed I) and not a random variable.
Ideally, we would like to separate E[s
 z] to E[s
 ]E[z], but since s
 and z are correlated we cannot do
that. Nevertheless, the correlation decrease as  increases which suggests that for suciently large  we
can separate the two terms. In Subsection 4.1, we present a dynamic programming method for computing
E[s
 z] for any xed . We then use the dynamic program to compute the lower bound on E[s
 z] for values
of   5000. In Subsection 4.2, we give a lower bound on E[s
 z] for all values of  >= 5000 by separating
the E[s
 z] to E[s
 ]E[z] and subtracting the maximum possible error caused by that.
4.1 When there are a few bids above the optimal uniform price
In this subsection we show the following:
 We show how we can compute a lower bound on E[s
 z] and therefore for E[RSOP] for any xed .
 We compute the above lower bound for all values of  up to 5000 and verify that for 10    5000 it
is indeed at least 1
4. The computed lower bounds for various values of  can be found in Table 1.
We can compute a lower bound for E[s
 z] and therefore for E[RSOP] by dening a set of events and
then breaking E[s
 z] over those events using the law of total expectation. As we showed before, E[RSOP] 
E[s
 z] so we only need to compute a lower bound on E[s
 z]. Since s
 and z are correlated random variables
we cannot separate them in E[s
 z]. The idea is that when we condition E[s
 z] on any of these events we
can derive lower bounds for both s
 and z. We then use the above method to compute a lower bound on
E[RSOP] for all the values of   5000 to show that for 10    5000 the lower bound is at least 1
4. In the
next subsection, we prove a lower bound of better than 1
4 for all values of  > 5000.
First we dene the following notation:
ET
R : If T  N is a subset of indices and R is an interval which is in [0;1) and sup(R) is the supremum of
R then ET
R is the event in which for all indices i 2 T, we have si
i  sup(R) and at least for one i in set
T we have si
i 2 R. Formally, ET
R = f8i 2 T : si
i < sup(R) ^ 9i 2 T : si
i 2 Rg.
For example, we might use E
[4;10]
[0:4;0:5] to denote the event in which for 4  i  10 the si
i is at most 0:5
and there is some 4  j  10 such that
sj
j 2 [0:4;0:5]. As a shorthand we might sometimes use a single
number instead of an interval to denote the interval from 0 up to and including that number. We may
also omit the subset of indices altogether in which case we assume [0;1). So we can derive the following
alternate notations: Ek
, E. We may also use one special notation Ek;j
 = f8i  k : si
i   ^ sk = jg.
Pr[E] : The probability of event E happening.
b E[XjE] : The normalized conditional expected value of a random variable X which is:
b E[XjE] = E[XjE]Pr[E] (4.7)
We rst show the following:
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Figure 1: LEFT: E denotes the event in which the points (i;si) lie in the gray area. The gure shows the
plot of (i;si) for an instance of random partitioning in which the event E for  = 3
4 has occurred. RIGHT:
E[i;i+1) denotes the event in which the points (i;si) lie bellow the line y = i+1x but there is at least one
point above the line y = ix. The gure shows the plot of (i;si) for an instance of random partitioning in
which the event E[2;3) has occurred (indicated by the dark gray region).
Lemma 4.5. For any sequence of 0; ;m such that 0 = 0 < 1 <  < m = 1, the following is a
lower bound on E[s
 z]:
E[
s

z] 
m X
i=1
( b E[
s

jEi]   b E[
s

jEi 1])
1   i
i
(4.8)
in which by denition Ei is the event in which for any index j, the fraction of the v1; ;vj that fall in set
A is less than i. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
We instead prove the following more general statement.
Lemma 4.6. For any given positive random variable x and any sequence of 0; ;m such that 0 = 0 <
1 <  < m = 1, the following inequality always holds in which the random variable z1 is dened as
z1 = min(z;1):
E[xz]  E[xz1] 
m X
i=1
( b E[xjEi]   b E[xjEi 1])
1   i
i
(4.9)
In which by denition Ei is the event in which for any index j, the fraction of the v1; ;vj that fall in
set A is less than i.
Proof. First we dene a set of m events E[0;1); ;E[m 1;m) as illustrated in Figure 1. The rst inequality
in (4.9) is trivial. To prove the second one, we rst break the E[xz1] to small pieces with each piece
conditioned on one of those events. Notice that for i 6= j we have E[i;i+1) \ E[j;j+1) = ; so these events
are disjoints which means based on Proposition B.1, we can write E[xz1] as the following:
6E[xz1] 
m X
i=1
b E[xz1jE[i 1;i)] (4.10)
E[xz1] 
m X
i=1
b E[x
1   i
i
jE[i 1;i)] (4.11)
E[xz1] 
m X
i=1
b E[xjE[i 1;i)]
1   i
i
(4.12)
Note that b E[xjE] denotes E[xjE]Pr[E] which is the normalized expected value. According to the denition
of the event E[i 1;i), for each such event, we can use 1 i
i as a lower bound for z1 to get (4.11). Since 1 i
i
is a constant we can take it out of the expected value to get (4.12).
Now consider the event E[0;i). We can decompose that to two disjoint events E[0;i 1) and E[i 1;i) so
we can write:
b E[xjE[0;i)] = b E[xjE[0;i 1)] + b E[xjE[i 1;i)] (4.13)
We can then combine (4.13) and (4.12) to get the following which is the claim of the lemma:
E[xz1] 
m X
i=1
( b E[xjE[0;i)]   b E[xjE[0;i 1)])
1   i
i
(4.14)
The intuition behind Lemma 4.6 is the following: We want to nd lower bounds on z so we break the
expected value over a set of small events. Under each event Ei we have z  1 i
i based on the denition of
Ei. Roughly, b E[xjEi]   b E[xjEi 1] is the portion of the expected value for which the best lower bound for
z that we can guarantee is 1 i
i .
The choice of m and 0; ;m in Lemma 4.6 greatly aects the value of the lower bound. Generally,
increasing m improves the lower bound but at the cost of more computation. We will provide the values of
i and m that we used to get our desired lower bound later.
We claim that the coecient of each term b E[xjEi] on the right hand side of (4.6) is positive and therefore
we can use a lower bound for each b E[xjEi] instead of its exact value and the inequality still holds. We prove
our claim as follows. If we expand the sum on the right hand side of (4.9), each b E[s
 jEi] appears exactly
twice except for i = 0 and i = m. Since 0 = 0 and m = 1, the value of b E[s
 jE0] is 0 and also the
coecient of b E[s
 jEm] is 0. Except for those two, every other b E[s
 jEi] has a coecient of 1 i
i  
1 i+1
i+1
which is positive and proves our claim. Therefore, we can relax the inequality by substituting each b E[s
 jEi]
with its lower bound. So far, the problem has been reduced to computing a lower bound on b E[s
 jEi] which
we explain next.
Lemma 4.7. For any random variable x such that x 2 [0;1] and any  2 [0;1] and any n 2 N the following
always holds:
b E[xjE]  b E[xjEn
]   Pr[En
](1   Pr[E(n;1)
 ]) (4.15)
Proof. See Section B.
Intuitively, Lemma 4.7 is saying that if instead of computing b E[xjE] we can approximate it by b E[xjEn
],
the maximum that we may over-approximate is at most Pr[En
](1   Pr[E
(n;1)
 ]) which is the probability of
the event in which for any j < n, sj < j and then there is some j0 > n such that sj0  j0. Note that since
x  1, its normalized expected value conditioned on any event is less than the probability of that event. By
7choosing a large enough n we can make sure that the over approximation upper bound gets close enough to
0.
Again, in Lemma 4.7, increasing n improves the lower bound, but the computation cost of b E[s
 jEn
] and
Pr[En
] will increase.
To use Lemma 4.7 for x = s
 , eectively we need to be able to compute b E[s
 jEn
], Pr[En
] and Pr[E
(n;1)
 ].
Next we show how to compute the rst two exactly by using dynamic programming. Later in Lemma 4.9
we show how to get a lower bound on the third one.
Lemma 4.8. The exact value of b E[s
 jEn
] and Pr[En
] can be computed using the following dynamic program.
Recall that Ek;j
 is the event in which for all r  k, the fraction of v1; ;vr that fall in A is less than  and
exactly j of v1; ;vk fall in A:
Pr[Ek;j
 ] =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1
2Pr[Ek 1;j
 ]
j = 0
k > 0
1
2Pr[Ek 1;j
 ] + 1
2Pr[Ek 1;j 1
 ] 0 < j  k
0 j > k
1 j = k = 0
(4.16)
b E[
s

jEk;j
 ] =
8
> > <
> > :
0 j = 0
1
2 b E[s
 jEk 1;j
 ] + 1
2 b E[s
 jEk 1;j 1
 ]
0 < j  k
k > 
j
Pr[Ek;j
 ]
0  j  k
k = 
(4.17)
Pr[Ek
] =
k X
j=0
Pr[Ek;j
 ] (4.18)
b E[
s

jEk
] =
k X
j=0
b E[
s

jEk;j
 ] (4.19)
Proof. See Section B.
Intuitively, (4.16) means the event Ek;j
 happens if either Ek 1;j
 happens and vj falls in set A (which
happens with probability 1
2) or Ek 1;j 1
 happens and vj falls in set B (again, with probability 1
2). The
intuition behind (4.17) is very similar to (4.16) when k > . When k = , under the event Ek;j
 we know
that exactly j of v1; ;v are in set A and so s
 =
j
k.
Computing b E[s
 jEn
] and Pr[En
] using the above recurrence relation and dynamic programming takes
O(n2) time and O(n) memory.
Finally, in order to complete our lower bounding method we need to compute Pr[E
(n;1)
 ]. Next we show
how we can nd a lower bound for Pr[E
(n;1)
 ].
Lemma 4.9. For any  2 [0:5;1] and any n;n0 2 N such that n < n0, the following two always hold:
Pr[E(n;1)
 ]  (1  
C
n
0+1
1   C
)
n
0
Y
k=n+1
(1   C
k) (4.20)
in which :
C =
( 1
   1)
2(1   )
(4.21)
Proof. See Section B.
(4.20) is based on a variant of Cherno bound and gives a very good lower bound when n and n0 are
suciently large.
8To get the desired lower bound for RSOP we set the parameters as the following. In using Lemma 4.6 we
set m = 100, 1 = 0:5, m = 1:0 and distribut the 2; ;m 1 evenly on [0:5;1:0] (that is i i 1 = 0:5
m 1).
We then used Lemma 4.7 to compute b E[s
 jEi] for each i together with Lemma 4.8 by setting n = 5000 and
also used Lemma 4.9 to compute Pr[E
(n;1)
 ] by setting n0 = 100000.
The results of our computation for various choices of  is listed in Table 1. Notice that for  > 10 we get
a lower bound better than 0:25 and thus a competitive ratio better than 4.
4.2 When there are many bids above the optimal uniform price
In this subsection we show the following:
 We show how to compute a lower bound on E[s
 z] that holds for all values of  > 5000.
 We compute the above lower bound for  = 5000 to get a lower bound of 1
3:52, thus showing that for
all  > 5000, E[RSOP]  E[s
 z] > 1
3:52.
In the previous subsection, we showed how to compute a lower bound for E[s
 z] for any xed value of 
and we used that to compute the E[s
 z] for all values of  up to 5000.
The idea is that when  is large (i.e.,  > 5000), the two random variables s
 and z are almost independent
and so the expected value of their product is very close to the product of their expected values. Also for a
large  the value of s
 is very close to 1
2 so E[s
 z] would be roughly 1
2E[z].
Lemma 4.10. For any  2 [0;1] the following always holds:
E[
s

z]  (E[z1]   Pr[E[;]
 ]) (4.22)
Proof. See Section B.
Intuitively, when  is large, in (4.22) the Pr[E
[;]
 ] is very close to 0 even when  = 1
2   it roughly gives
a lower bound of about 1
2E[z1]. Next we show how to compute an upper bound on Pr[E
[;]
 ] to support our
claim.
Lemma 4.11. For any  2 [0;0:5], the following always holds:
Pr[E[;]
 ]  C0 1 (4.23)
in which :
C0 =
( 1
0   1)
0
2(1   0)
;0 = 1     
1
   1
(4.24)
Proof. See Section B.
The only task that remains is to compute a good lower bound on E[z1].
Theorem 4.12. E[z]  E[z1]  0:61. Intuitively, z is a measure of the least ratio of the number of bids in
B to the number of bids in A among any prex of the bids. A larger z indicates a more balanced partition.
This is an important statistic for any random sampling method in general (note that z only depends on how
we partition the bids and not the value of the bids).
Proof. We can apply the Lemma 4.6 by plugging x = 1 to compute E[z1] = E[xz1] to get the following:
E[z1] 
m X
i=1
( b E[1jEi]   b E[1jEi 1])
1   i
i
(4.25)
E[z1] 
m X
i=1
(Pr[Ei]   Pr[Ei 1])
1   i
i
(4.26)
9To get (4.26) from (4.25) we have used the denition of of b E[] from (4.7). Also, we have that Pr[E] 
Pr[En
]Pr[E
(n;1)
 ] by the FKG inequality [4]. We can apply the FKG inequality because the two events En

and E
(n;1)
 are positively correlated on the distributive lattice formed by partially ordering the instances of
the partitioning by a subset relation on set A therefore their probability of their intersection is greater than
or equal to the product of their probabilities. Again, if we substitute each Pr[Ei] with its lower bound the
inequality still holds because of the following. The coecient of each Pr[Ei] term after rearranging the sum
on the right hand side of (4.26) is positive except for Pr[E0] which is itself 0 because 0 = 0. By tuning
the parameters as we will explain at the end of this section we get a lower bound of E[z]  E[z1]  0:61.
It is worth mentioning that by using a similar method, we computed an upper bound of E[z]  0:63 which
indicates that our analysis of E[z] is very tight. 3
That completes our method for computing a lower bound on E[s
 z] which is independent of  for
suciently large .
To compute E[z1] we used (4.26) which we derived from Lemma 4.6 by setting x = 1, m = 100, 1 = 0:5,
m = 1:0 and distributing the 2; ;m 1 evenly on [0:5;1:0] (that is i   i 1 = 0:5
m 1). Together with
that we also used Lemma 4.9 by setting x = s
 , n = 60000 and n0 = 100000 and Lemma 4.8 by setting
n = 60000 to compute Pr[Ei] for each i.
To get our desired lower bound on E[s
 z] when     = 5000, we used Lemma 4.10 to separate the z
and s
 as in (4.22). Using E[z]  0:61 together with Lemma 4.11 and setting  = 0:52 we get that for any
 > 5000 , Pr[E
[;]
 ]  0:0183 and so E[RSOP]  0:284 which is equivalent to a competitive ratio of 3:52
which is better than 4.
5 The Exhaustive Search Lower-Bound
In the previous section, we showed that for  > 10, E[RSOP]  1
4. In this section, we show the following:
 We show how to compute an improved lower bound on E[RSOP] for any xed 2    10.
 We compute the above lower bound on E[RSOP] for all 2    10 to get a lower bound of 1
4 when
6    10 and a lower bound of 1
4:68 when 2    6. The computed values of our lower bound for
all values of 2    10 can be found in Table 2.
In the rest of this section we explain an Exhaustive-Search approach for improving the lower-bound of
RSOP for the cases where  is small (i.e.,   10). The basic lower bound of E[s
 z] in Section 4 does not
work well enough in these cases mainly because s
 and z are negatively correlated and their correlation is
much stronger when  is small. Also because v1 is always in B and so s1 is always 0, the expected value of
s
 decreases as  decreases such that for  = 2 we have s
 = 1
4 which is far from 1
2. The idea is to try all
possible values for the rst few vi but instead of using an exact value for each vi we use an interval for each
vi and we try all the possible combination of these intervals to cover all the possible input instances. We
then report the lowest E[RSOP] of all the dierent combinations as the lower bound.
Theorem 5.1. For any input instance I = fv1;v2;g where there are between 6 to 10 bids above the
optimal uniform price (i.e. 6    10), the expected revenue of RSOP is at least 1
4 (i.e., E[RSOP]  1
4).
Also, if there are between 2 to 5 bids above the optimal price, the expected revenue of RSOP is at least 1
4:68.
The actual computed lower bound values can be found in Table 2.
Due to the complexity of the proofs and because the technics are basically similar to those of the previous
sections, we only give an outline of our method.
First we dene 0 as the index of the winning price after  in the optimal single price auction (i.e., we
are choosing the winning price from the bids whose index are greater than ). Again we don't take 0 as
a random variable. Instead we provide a lower bound for RSOP for any xed  and 0 and another lower
bound for suciently large 0. Note that 0 depends on the set of bids as a whole and does not depend on
how the bids are partitioned by RSOP. Formally 0 = max argmaxi> ivi.
3Note that 1   1=e ' 0:6321 which is slightly greater that the upper bound of E[z]  0:63.
10Algorithm 5.2. Exhaustive-Search(m;;0;r;r0)
For some given m   we consider the rst m highest bids, that is v1; ;vm and also v0. We then restrict
each bid vi where i 2 S = f1; ;m;0g to some interval [li;hi] as we explain later and nd a lower-bound
for the revenue of RSOP assuming those restrictions. We try all the possible combination of these intervals
for the rst m bids and for v0 so as to cover all possible cases (remember that v = 1
 since we assumed
that OPT = 1). Then we take the lowest lower bound among all those combination and report it as the
lower bound of E[RSOP] for that specic choice of  and 0. We will also provide a way of computing a
lower bound which is independent of the actual 0 when 0 is greater than a certain value. We then take the
minimum of that for all choices of 0 and use it as a lower bound for E[RSOP] for the specic choice of
 (remember that we are only interested in   10 since for  > 10 the basic lower bound of Section 4 is
already better than 0:25).
In order to try all the combination of intervals we do the following. Since OPT = 1, each bid vi is
always in the interval [0; 1
i]. For some given parameter r, we divide this interval to r smaller intervals
[0
r
1
i; 1
r
1
i]; ;[r 1
r
1
i; r
r
1
i] . For each i 2 S, we set [li;ui] to one of the mentioned r intervals. We will do the
same thing for v0 except that we divide it to r0 dierent intervals for some given r0. As a result we can have
either r0(m 2)r or r0(m 1)r possible combinations depending on whether 0  m or 0 > m. Note that v
is always restricted to be exactly 1
 because OPT = 1. Also note that some of these combinations might be
partially or even entirely impossible because they should satisfy the constraint of vi 1  vi and 0v0 > ivi
for all i > . So we discard or rene some combinations (for example by setting ui   min(ui;ui 1)).
Next we show how we compute the lower bound based on the range restrictions of Algorithm 5.2.
Algorithm 5.3. _
Restricted-RSOP-Lowerbound(m;;0;r;r0;f(li;ui)g)
Here we use E[u0
Az0] as a lower bound for E[RSOP] in which again u0
A is a random variable indicating the
lower bound on the revenue of set A and z0 a random variable indicating the restricted least prex ratio of B
to A which is slightly dierent from z. In z0 we are considering the range restrictions that we explain next.
To compute the lower-bound, we enumerate all 2m 1 possible ways of partitioning v1; ;vm and refer to
them with events D1; ;D2m 1. Then based on the law of total expectation we can compute a lower-bound
by E[RSOP]  E[u0
Az0] =
P2
m 1
i=1 b E[u0
Az0jDi]. Basically, under each event Di, we x the partitioning of the
rst m bids and then apply all the previous techniques that we discussed in Section 4 to the tail of the bids
that is vm+1;vm+2; with some modication which we explain next. First, instead of using s
 as a lower
bound for the revenue of set A we use u0
A = maxi2S sili as a lower bound on the revenue of set A. We also
modify the (4.16), (4.17), (4.18), (4.19) to condition them on event Di. Also we replace the term
j
Pr[Ek;j
 ]
in (4.17) with u0
APr[Ek;j
 ]. The most important change in the computations from Section 4 is that whenever
the value of z is conditioned on an event ET
 (as dened in Subsection 4.1) if 0u0 < maxi2f1;;mg sili we
can argue that because by denition of 0, 0v0  ivi for all i > , then the winning price in set A should
be among v2; ;vm (because for all j > m we have jvj < maxi2f1;;mg sili and jvj is the maximum
revenue one can possibly get in set A by choosing vj as the winning price under event ET
).
By choosing m = 11, r = 3, r0 = 100 and the rest of the parameters as in Section 4 we get a lower bound
of 0:213845 for  = 2 over all values of 0 which is equivalent to a competitive ratio of 4:68 which is also the
upper bound of competitive ratio of RSOP over all . Table 2 shows the exhaustive search lower-bounds for
2    10. In our computations, we noticed that 0 =  + 1 was the worst case among all choices of 0.
6 An Upper Bound For The Performance of RSOP For Any 
In previous works, it has been shown that E[RSOP] is 1
4 for some instances (e.g. [3], [5]). However in all
those instances,  = 2. In this section, we show that the lower bound for E[RSOP] cannot be improved
further than 3=8 for any value of .
Theorem 6.1. For any  there exists an input instance I for which E[RSOP]  3
8.
Before proving the theorem we dene the following.
11Denition 6.2 (Equal Revenue Instance). We refer to the input instance as an Equal Revenue instance
if choosing any of the vi as the winning price yields the same revenue. An equal revenue instance with N
bidders with distinct bids is given by vi = 1
i .
Observation 6.3. For an equal revenue input instance, RSOP always oers the worst price to the other
set. In other words, the optimal price of set A is the worst price that we could oer to set B and vice versa.
The previous observation suggests that an equal revenue instance might actually be the worst case input
instance for RSOP however that is not quite true at least for small values of N. Furthermore, analyzing the
performance of RSOP on equal revenue instances for general N is not easy. Therefore, we dene a modied
version of RSOP, call it RSOP
0 which is very similar to RSOP and yields about the same revenue. We then
analyze the performance of RSOP
0 on equal revenue instances and use that to upper bound the performance
of RSOP. In RSOP
0, as in RSOP, we partition the bidders into two sets at random and then oer the best
single price of each set to the other set. The only dierence is in the case that one of the sets is empty. In
this case, in RSOP
0, the oered price from the empty side to the other set will be 1
N instead of 0.
Lemma 6.4. E[RSOP
0] on an equal revenue instance with N bidders with distinct bids is decreasing function
of N.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Assume 8i;j : i < j  N   1, E[RSOP
0] for an equal revenue instance
with i bids is larger than E[RSOP
0] for an equal revenue instance with j bids. Now, we need to show
8i;j : i < j  N this property holds as well. It is enough to show that E[RSOP
0] for an equal revenue
instance with N bidders is less than E[RSOP
0] for an equal revenue instance with N 1 bidders. Consider the
random partitions of the instance with N bidders. As before, WLOG assume that v1 2 B. Now, categorize
partitions to two groups:
1. Partitions in which vN 2 B. These partitions can be built by considering all the partitions for N   1
bidders and adding vN to B in each partition. Call the original partitions for N   1 bidders, A0 and
B0.
2. Partitions in which vN 2 A. Again we can build all these partitions by considering the partitions for
N   1 bidders and adding vN to A. Call the original partitions without vN, A0and B0.
Each of the above cases can happen with probability 1
2. We compare the expected revenue of each case with
E[RSOP
0] for equal revenue instance with N   1 bidders. In fact, we will show that the expected revenue
of partitions belonging to case 1, is exactly the same as E[RSOP
0] for equal revenue instance with N   1
distinct bids. Also, we show that the expected revenue of cases of partitions belonging to case 2, is at most
equal to E[RSOP
0] of the equal revenue instance with N   1 distinct bids.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the partitions belonging to case 1 and partitions of the
equal revenue instance with N   1 bidders. We can see that the revenue of each partition is exactly the
same as the revenue of its corresponding partition with N  1 bidders. Consider the partition A and B and
its corresponding partition A0 and B0. If A0 6= ; (and correspondingly A 6= ;) , the oered price to B0 is
the same as the oered price to B by A and it is always larger than 1
N. It means that the revenue obtained
from the bids in B0 that belongs to B is also the same and we don't obtain any revenue from vN since it is
smaller than the the oered price. If A = A0 = ;, the oered price to the other set, for the equal revenue
case with N   1 bidders, is 1
N 1 and the obtained revenue from B0 is (N   1): 1
N 1 = 1. For the case with
N bidders, the oered price to the other set is 1
N however we have also N bidders in B so the total revenue
obtained from B is N: 1
N which gives the same revenue.
We have also a one-to-one correspondence between partitions in case 2 and the partitions of the equal
revenue instance with N   1 bidders. If A0 6= ;, then the obtained revenue from B is at most equal to the
obtained revenue from B0. There are two possible cases here. Either the oered price to B and B0 are the
same, in which case the obtained revenue from both sets are the same as well. In the other case, adding
1
N to A0 ( to obtain A) has changed the best price for A. In the latter case, the oered price by A to B
should be 1
N. Also note that, in the partition of an equal revenue instance, the best price for set A is the
worst oered price for set B, which means that we are only reducing the revenue obtained from B when we
change the selected price in A to 1
N from the selected price for A0. Also if A0 = ;, the obtained revenue
in the equal revenue instance with N   1 bidders is 1. However in the corresponding instance, containing
12vN = 1
N in A, the oered price to B is 1
N and we have only N   1 bids in B in this case. So the total
obtained revenue is n 1
n < 1. So the expected revenue of all the partitions belonging to the second category
is less than E[RSOP
0] for equal revenue instances with N   1 bidders. Putting both cases together, we can
conclude that the total expected revenue is only decreased when the number of bidders is increased.
It can be shown that for equal-revenue instances, E[RSOP] = E[RSOP
0]   1
2N 1. The revenue obtained
by both methods are always the same except for the case that A = ;. This event happens with probability
1
2N 1 and the obtained revenue is 1. (The obtained revenue in RSOP
0 is 1 and the revenue of RSOP is 0 in
this case.)
It can be shown that for N  6, for the equal revenue instances, E[RSOP
0]  1
2:65. Using Lemma 6.4, we
can conclude that E[RSOP]  1=2:65 for the equal revenue instance for any N. Finally, for any given winner
index j, we show how to nd an instance for which we have  = j and also E[RSOP] for that instance is
equal to E[RSOP] for the equal revenue instance with j bidders. For a given j, we dene its corresponding
instance as follows (and refer to it as perturbed equal revenue): Consider the equal revenue instance with j
bidders. Construct the perturbed equal revenue instance by changing only vj to 1
j +  instead of 1
j. (The
value of the rest of the bids are similar to the equal revenue instance.)
It is easy to see that the revenue obtained by RSOP from the equal revenue instance with j bidders is
converging to the revenue obtained from perturbed equal revenue instance when  ! 0 which completes the
proof of the theorem.
7 Robust RSOP
In this section we propose a robust variant of RSOP that achieves very close to the 1=4 of the optimal
revenue with high probability when  is suciently large. The same high probability argument cannot be
said about the revenue of RSOP. First we dene the Robust RSOP (RRSOP):
Denition 7.1 (RRSOP). Robust RSOP with parameter  2 (0;1) works as follows. It partitions the bids
into two groups A and B uniformly at random. It then computes the smallest -optimal price of each set
and oers that to the other set. For a set of bids G = hu1  u2    uki, the smallest -optimal price
is u

G where 

G = maxfij1  i  k;iui  G  uGg where G is the index of the optimal single price for
set G (i.e. G = argmaxi iui). In plain English, 

G is the index of the highest bid that if oered to set G,
obtains at least  fraction of the optimal single price revenue of set G.
Next we present the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 7.2. For any given ; 2 (0;1). There exist a (;) and (;) such that for all instances of
bids with  > (;), RRSOP(;) achieves 1
4    of the optimal single price revenue with probability 1   .
Furthermore, for all input instances, RRSOP obtains at least (0:5 ) 1
4:68 which is at least one-tenth of the
optimal revenue for small enough epsilon.
Before we prove the theorem, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 7.3. Under RRSOP, for an instance of partitioning in which s
 > , it must be that 

A  .
Proof. From the denition of RRSOP we can argue that if 

A <  it must be that in set A the revenue
of oering v

A is more that  times the revenue of choosing v. In particular, that implies s
 <  because
oering v to A generates a revenue that is s
 fraction of the overall optimal and the revenue of oering 

A
to set A cannot be more than the overall optimal revenue. That means if s
   then 

G cannot be smaller
that .
When  is large, we expect s
 to be close to 1
2. That means if  < 1
2 then for a large enough  with high
probability s
 >  which according to Lemma 7.3 implies A
G > . Furthermore, we can also show that with
high probability the minj>
 sj
sj is close to 1 which together means the revenue of RRSOP is closr to 1
4
with high probability. We prove this formally next.
13Proof of Theorem 7.2. Given the pair (;), we set  = 0:5  
2. By applying Lemma 4.11 we can argue that:
Pr[
s

> ] = 1   Pr[E[;]
 ] (7.1)
 1   C0 1 (7.2)
in which :
C0 =
( 1
0   1)
0
2(1   0)
;0 = 1     
1
   1
(7.3)
Observe that C0 is itself decreasing in  (when  < 0:5) and 1   C0 1 decreases exponentially fast as
 grows. So by choosing a large enough  we can ensure that Pr[s
 > ]  1   
2. Conditioned on s
 > ,
we can apply Lemma 7.3 and conclude that 

A  . Now to bound the ratio of the revenue of set B to set
A which is


A s
A
s
A
by 1   2, we condition on the event E
(;1)
 with  = 0:5 + 
2. By applying Lemma 4.9
and setting n = n0 =  we can argue that:
Pr[E(;1)
 ]  (1  
C

1   C
) (7.4)
in which :
C =
( 1
   1)
2(1   )
(7.5)
Notice that C < 1 so C

1 C decreases exponentially fast as  grows. So for large enough  we get
Pr[E
(;1)
 ]  1  
2. Also notice that conditioned on event E
(;1)
 with  = 0:5+ 
2 we can argue that for all
0   we have

0 s0
s0  1   2. Combining this with the argument in the previous paragraph we can infer
that for large enough  the two event s
 > 0:5  
2 and E
(;1)
 happen at the same time with probability at
least 1    and conditioned on them we get 

A   so the revenue of RRSOP is at least   s
 


A s
A
s
A
which is at least (0:5   
2)(0:5   
2)(1   2)  1
4    which completes the proof. Notice that the dependence
of the threshold for  on  and  is only logarithmic.
To prove the second part of the theorem, notice that all of the lower bounds that we proved for RSOP in
the previous sections hold for RRSOP if we scale them by . The worst case lower bound that we proved
was 1
4:68 so even for input instances with small , RRSOP achieves at least (0:5  
2) 1
4:68 in expectation.
8 The combinatorial case of h and 1
In this section, we describe a combinatorial approach which shows that E[RSOP] is at least 1
4 of the optimal
revenue for all the instances where bidders have only one of the two possible valuations, 1 and h. We call an
instance, an equal revenue instance, if selecting either 1 or h as the uniform price returns the same revenue.
In the rest of this section, for a given instance of input, we denote the number of h bids by Nh and the
number of 1 bids by N1. Also the revenue obtained from a set S by oering price p, is represented by
Prof(S;p). We rst show that:
Lemma 8.1. For an equal revenue instance, E[RSOP]  1
4OPT + h
4.
Proof. The proof is based on induction on Nh. We rst show that for the base case of Nh = 1, we have
E[RSOP]  h
2 = h
4 + h
4.
Because this is an equal revenue instance, when Nh = 1, it should be that N1 = h 1. Now consider the
partitioning of the bidders into two groups A and B. WLOG, assume that v1 2 B which means the optimal
14price of set B which is oered to set A is h and Prof(A;h) = 0. On the other hand, since the valuations of all
bidders in set A are 1 the optimal price of set A which is oered to set B is always 1. To compute Prof(B;1)
it is enough to compute E[jBj]. Since bidders are partitioned uniformly at random, we can conclude that
E[jBj] = h 1
2 + 1  h=2 which completes the proof for Nh = 1.
To prove the induction step for Nh, we assume that for all values of Nh  k, E[RSOP]  OPT=4 + h=4.
Now consider an equal revenue instance I with Nh = k+1. We can write all the possible ways of partitioning
the bids in this new instance as the cartesian product of all the possible ways to partition the bids into two
equal revenue instances, one with Nh = 1 and the other with Nh = k. In other words, call the instance with
Nh = 1, I1 and the instance with Nh = k, I2. Construct all the possible partitions of bidders into two groups
(A and B) for the equal revenue instance with Nh = k + 1. We can see that any possible partition in I can
be constructed by combining exactly one partition of I1 and one partition of I2(one-to-one mapping). For
a given partition A and B of an instance I, call the corresponding partitions from I1, A1 and B1 and the
corresponding partition from I2, A2 and B2, so A = A1 [ A2 and B = B1 [ B2. In the rest of this section,
we use the simple observation that in any equal revenue instance I, if the optimal price for set A is 1, then
the optimal price for B has to be h and vice versa. In the rest of the proof, we use the notion of price pair
to present the optimal prices of each side of a partition. (e.g. price pair (1;h) means that the optimal price
for set A is 1 and the optimal price for set B is h.)
We have 4 possible price pair's for a combination of two partitions taken from I1 and I2. However, 2 of
these 4 cases can be reduced to the other 2 by renaming A and B, so we only consider the rst 2 cases:
 The price pair of both (A1;B1) and (A2;B2) are (1;h). Call the combination of these partitions (A;B).
We can see that the price pair for (A;B) would be (1;h) as well. So the extracted revenue from each
side, is exactly equal to the sum of the revenues obtained from (A1;B1) and (A2;B2).
 The price pair of (A1;B1) is (1;h) but the price pair for (A2;B2) is (h;1). Since, we are considering
an equal revenue instance, we know that price pair for (A;B) should be either (1;h) or (h;1) as well.
WLOG assume the price pair of (A;B) is (1;h). We can see that, the revenue extracted from bidders
in I1 in (A;B) partition is exactly the same as the extracted revenue in (A1;B1) instance since the
oered prices to each side are the same. Now, for the bidders belonging to I2, the extracted revenue in
(A;B) is at least as high as the extracted revenue in (A2;B2) partition. The reason is that, in I2 the
oered price to B2 is h however the best price for B2 is 1.( Since the price pair for (A2;B2) was (h;1))
So by oering price 1 to B2, the extracted revenue from bidders on the B2 side is only increased. Also
by using the same argument, oering price h to bids in A2 is only increasing the extracted revenue
from them. So we can conclude that, in this case, the extracted revenue in (A;B), is at least as high
as the sum of the extracted revenue from (A1;B1) and (A2;B2).
We can rewrite E[RSOP] as the sum of the expected revenue obtained from bidders in I1 and the expected
revenue obtained from bidders in I2. Since every partition of bidders in I1 appears in the same number of
partitions of I and by using the above argument, we can conclude that the expected revenue obtained from
bidders in I1, is at least as much E[RSOP] for the equal revenue instance I1. Using similar argument for I2,
we can see that E[RSOP] for the equal revenue instance I, is at least as much as the sum of the E[RSOP] for
equal revenue instances I1 and I2. Now, by using induction, we have EI[RSOP]  EI1[RSOP]+EI2[RSOP] 
h 1
4 + h
4 + h
4 + h
4 > OPT=4 + h=4.
Next, we show how to use lemma 8.1 to prove that:
Lemma 8.2. The competitive ratio of RSOP for any instance with only two kind of valuations is at most 4.
In lemma 8.1, we proved that the competitive ratio of RSOP is at most 4 for equal revenue instances.
Here, we show that in fact, we can generalize the result to any instance consisting of 1 and h bids. We face
two scenarios here:
1. Either n1  nh(h   1) which means that our instance is a combination of an equal revenue instance
and a extra set of bidders with value 1.
2. Or n1 < nh(h   1). That means, we have an instance which is a combination of an equal revenue
instance and some extra (at least 1) bidder(s) with valuation h and less than h   1 extra bidder(s)
with valuation 1.
15We give the proof for each scenario separately. Again, we denote the original instance by I, the equal revenue
part of I, by I1 and the rest by I2. Also, for a partition (A;B) of I, we denote the part of A belonging to
I1 by A1 and the part belonging to I2 by A2. (Similarly for B with B1 and B2.)
In scenario 1, either the price pair of (A1;B1) is (1;h) or it is (h;1). In the rst case , we can conclude
that (A;B) is either (1;1) or (1;h) which means that the oered price from A to B is always 1. So the
obtained revenue from set B is equal to the sum of the revenues of B1 and B2 in I1 and I2 instances. If the
oered price from B to A is 1, with the similar argument given in Lemma 8.1, we can see that the revenue
obtained from B is at least as much as the total revenue of B1 and B2 in I1 and I2 instances. However if
the oered price is h, we get the same revenue from the bids that were coming from A1 and we loose all the
revenue that was obtained from A2. However the amount of loss can be upper bounded by the number of
1's in I2 which is at most h. The conclusion is that the obtained revenue from (A;B) for instance I, is at
least as much as the the revenue that we could obtain from (A1;B1) for instance I1. By using lemma 8.1 we
know that the obtained revenue by RSOP from (A1;B1) is at least Nh=4h+h=4. Also the optimal revenue
that can be obtained from (A;B) is at most Nh  h + h. That means that we already obtained 1=4 of the
optimal revenue by RSOP.
In scenario 2, the best price for I is h. We call the number of h bids in I1 by N1
h and the number of
h bids belonging to I2 by N2
h. The optimal revenue can be dened by Nh  h. Here we are in one of the
following cases:
 Either the price pair of (A1;B1) is (1;h) and for (A2;B2) is (1;h) ( which means that the number of
h bids in A2 is 0). In this case, the price pair of (A;B) is (1;h). This means that the revenue that we
obtain from bidders in I1 in (A;B) is the same as the revenue we obtained in (A1;B1). However, we
are loosing the revenue from h bids in B2.
 Or (A1;B1) = (1;h) and (A2;B2) = (h;h). There are two possibilities here: Either price pair of (A;B)
is (h;h) or it is (1;h). If the price pair is (h;h), the revenue obtained from A1 in (A;B) is the same as
the obtained revenue in I1 with partition (A1;B1). However the revenue obtained from B1 can only
increase since we oer price h. Also, in this case, we extract all the revenue from h bids in I2.
On the other hand, if (A;B) = (1;h) we again extract the same revenue from the instance I1 and also
we obtain all the revenue from the h bids in A2.
So in both cases, the revenue extracted in I from the bidders belonging to I1, is at least as much as the amount
extracted in RSOP from those bidders in I1 instance. Also we always extract all the revenue from bidders
with h value that are belonging to A2. Assuming that we are partitioning the bidders always uniformly at
random, we can conclude that the expected number of h bids belonging to A2 is N2
h=2. So the total revenue
obtained by RSOP from I is at least the revenue obtained by RSOP from I1 plus h  N2
h=2. In other words
the revenue that will be obtained in this scenario is at least h  N1
h=4 + h=4 + N2
h=2 > h  Nh=4. Thus,
E[RSOP]  OPT=4 for all instances with only two dierent bid values.
9 Conclusion
We have further improved upon the bounds on the competitiveness of RSOP through a mix of probabilistic
techniques and computer-aided analysis. More specically, we have proved that the competitive ratio of
RSOP is: (i) less than 4:68, (ii) less than 4 if the number of winners  is at least 6; and (iii) upper-bounded
by a quantity that approaches 3:3 as  ! 1, and (iv) has a robust version as  gets large. These indicate
that RSOP does much better than known in the practically-interesting case where  is \large", and that
perhaps the only case where the competitive ratio of 4 is attained is the case where  = 2 and v1 = 2v2. It
is an interesting open problem to pin down the competitive ratio as a function of . We have also shown
that even if  gets arbitrarily large, one can construct instances I with such , for which the competitive
ratio is at least 2:65. Finally, our work presents a combinatorial approach for the case where the bid values
are chosen from f1;hg, and shows that the competitive ratio of RSOP is at most 4 in this case.
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17A Results
 E[RSOP] Competitive-Ratio
2 0.125148 7.99
3 0.166930 5.99
4 0.192439 5.20
5 0.209222 4.78
6 0.221407 4.52
7 0.230605 4.34
8 0.237862 4.20
9 0.243764 4.10
10 0.248647 4.02
11 0.252774 3.96
15 0.264398 3.78
20 0.273005 3.66
30 0.282297 3.54
50 0.290384 3.44
100 0.296993 3.37
200 0.300549 3.33
300 0.301784 3.31
500 0.302792 3.30
1000 0.303560 3.29
1500 0.303818 3.29
2000 0.303949 3.29
Table 1: The result of using the basic lower-bound by choosing n = 5000
 E[RSOP] Competitive-Ratio
2 0.2138 4.68
3 0.2178 4.59
4 0.238 4.20
5 0.243 4.11
6 0.2503 3.99
7 0.2545 3.93
8 0.2602 3.84
9 0.2627 3.81
10 0.2669 3.75
Table 2: The result of using the exhaustive-search lower-bound by choosing m = 11, r = 3, r0 = 100
B Proofs
Proposition B.1. For any random variable X and any event E = [iEi such that for all i 6= j : Ei \ Ej = ;
we may write b E[XjE] =
P
i b E[XjEi].
Proof. Immediate from the law of total expectation.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. We can decompose the event En
 to two disjoint events E
[0;n]
 \E
(n;1)
 and E
[0;n]
 \E
(n;1)

so we can write:
b E[xjEn
] = b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E(n;1)
 ] + b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ] (B.1)
b E[xjEn
] = b E[xjE] + b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ] (B.2)
b E[xjE] = b E[xjEn
]   b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ] (B.3)
In order to derive (B.1), we have used Proposition B.1. Also we have substituted E
[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 with
the equivalent single event E to get (B.2). Rearranging the terms, we get (B.3). We can further relax the
inequality by substituting an upper bound for b E[xjE
[0;n]
i \ E
(n;1)
i ] which we give next:
18b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ]  Pr[E[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ] (B.4)
b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ]  Pr[E[0;n]
 ]Pr[E
(n;1)
 ] (B.5)
b E[xjE[0;n]
 \ E
(n;1)
 ]  Pr[E[0;n]
 ](1   Pr[E(n;1)
 ]) (B.6)
(B.4) can be derived from the denition of b E[] in (4.7) and the fact that x is at most 1. Since the
two events E
[0;n]
i and E
(n;1)
i are negatively correlated (to prove that we can dene a distributive lattice
on the instances of the partitioning such that for two partition instances (A;B) and (A0;B0) we dene
(A;B) < (A0;B0) if and only if A  A0, then E
[0;n]
i is a decreasing function on the lattice and E
(n;1)
i is an
increasing function on the lattice), so by FKG inequality we can argue that the probability of the intersection
of those two events is less than or equal to the product of their individual probabilities and so we get (B.5).
By combining (B.5) and (B.3) we get the following which is the claim of the lemma:
b E[xjE]  b E[xjEn
]   Pr[E[0;n]
 ](1   Pr[E(n;1)
 ]) (B.7)
Proof of Lemma 4.8. The proof of (4.16) is trivial. Let Ai denote the event that vi falls in set A. The event
Ek;j
 can be decomposed to two disjoint events Ek 1;j
 \Ak and Ek 1;j 1
 \Ak and therefore its probability is
the sum of the probabilities of those two. Each of those two events is also the intersection of two independent
events and can be written as the product of the probabilities of those events. Also Pr[Ak] = 1
2. Therefore
we can conclude the (4.16).
To prove (4.17) we consider the case of k =  and the case of k >  separately. When k = , from the
denition of Ek;j
 we can immediately conclude that s = j and so b E[s
 jEk;j
 ] =
j
 and by denition of b E[]
in (4.7) we get b E[s
 jEk;j
 ] =
j
Pr[Ek;j
 ]. For the case of k > , again we break the event Ek;j
 to two disjoint
events Ek 1;j
 \ Ak and Ek 1;j 1
 \ Ak and then compute them separately and add them together. Next we
give the proof for the rst event (The proof for the second one is the same):
b E[
s

jEk 1;j
 \ Ak] = E[
s

jEk 1;j
 \ Ak]Pr[Ek 1;j
 \ Ak] (B.8)
b E[
s

jEk 1;j
 \ Ak] = E[
s

jEk 1;j
 ]Pr[Ek 1;j
 ]Pr[Ak] (B.9)
b E[
s

jEk 1;j
 \ Ak] = b E[
s

jEk 1;j
 ]
1
2
(B.10)
To derive (B.9) we have used the fact that E[s
 jEk 1;j
 \ Ak] = E[s
 jEk 1;j
 ] since Ek 1;j
 only depend
on A1; ;Ak 1 and independent of Ak and s does not change by the event Ak.
The proof of (4.18) and (4.19) follow immediately from Proposition B.1 since the Ek;j
 events are disjoint
for dierent values of j.
The following theorem is a standard Cherno-Hoeding bound [10]:
Theorem B.2 (Cherno-Hoeding). For (i.i.d) random variables x1;x2;:::;xn where p = E[xi] and xi 2
f0;1g and for some " > 0 we have
Pr

1
n
X
xi  p + "


 
p
p + "
p+"
1   p
1   p   "
1 p "!n
(B.11)
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Let ai be an indicator random variable which is 1 when vi falls in set A and 0 otherwise.
We use Theorem B.2 by setting xi = ai and p = 0:5 and " =    0:5 to get an upper bound on Pr[E
[n;n]
 ]
and thus a lower bound on 1   Pr[E
[n;n]
 ]. Note that a1 is always 0 and consequently x1 = 0, however that
19only decreases the probability on the left hand side of (B.11) so it still holds. After simplifying we get the
following:
Pr[E[n;n]
 ]  1   C
n in which : C =
( 1
   1)
2(1   )
(B.12)
For any n0 2 (n;1) we can write E
(n;1)
 = E
(n
0;1)
 \ (
Tn
0
k=n+1 E
[k;k]
 ). Note that all the E
[k;k]
 events for
dierent values of k and E
(n
0;1)
 are positively correlated. So we can use the FKG inequality to get (B.13):
Pr[E(n;1)
 ]  Pr[E(n
0;1)
 ]
n
0
Y
k=n+1
Pr[E[k;k]
 ] (B.13)
Pr[E(n;1)
 ]  (1  
1 X
k=n0+1
Pr[E
[k;k]
 ])
n
0
Y
k=n+1
Pr[E[k;k]
 ] (B.14)
Pr[E(n;1)
 ]  (1  
1 X
k=n0+1
C
k)
n
0
Y
k=n+1
(1   C
k) (B.15)
Pr[E(n;1)
 ]  (1  
C
n
0+1
1   C
)
n
0
Y
k=n+1
(1   C
k) (B.16)
Computing (B.16) for any arbitrary n0 2 (n;1) will give us a lower bound. Choosing a larger n0 gives a
better bound.
Proof of Lemma 4.10. Note that we always have z  z1. So we can write:
E[
s

z]  E[
s

z1] (B.17)
E[
s

z]  b E[
s

z1jE
[;]
 ] + b E[
s

z1jE[;]
 ] (B.18)
E[
s

z]  b E[
s

z1jE
[;]
 ] (B.19)
E[
s

z]   b E[z1jE
[;]
 ] (B.20)
E[
s

z]  (E[z1]   b E[z1jE[;]
 ]) (B.21)
E[
s

z]  (E[z1]   Pr[E[;]
 ]) (B.22)
(B.18) and (B.21) use Proposition B.1. Also, based on the denition of event E
[;]
 , we have s
 >  and
so we can replace s
 with  to get (B.20). (B.22) can be derived from (B.21) by substituting z1 with 1 and
applying the denition of b E[] from (4.7).
Proof of Lemma 4.11. Let ai be an indicator random variable which is 1 when vi falls in set A and 0
20otherwise. We can rewrite Pr[E
[;]
 ] as the following:
Pr[E[;]
 ] = Pr[
s

< ] (B.23)
Pr[E[;]
 ] = Pr[
   s

> 1   ] (B.24)
Pr[E[;]
 ] = Pr[
P
j=1 aj

> 1   ] (B.25)
Pr[E[;]
 ] = Pr[
1 +
P
j=2 aj

> 1   ] (B.26)
Pr[E[;]
 ] = Pr[
P
j=2 aj

> 1     
1

] (B.27)
Pr[E[;]
 ]  Pr[
P
j=2 aj
   1
> 1     
1

] (B.28)
Now we can apply Theorem B.2 to (B.28) by setting xj = aj 1 (note that a1 is always 1), n =    1,
p = 0:5 and  = 0:5      1
 and after simplifying we get the following upper bound:
Pr[E[;]
 ]  C0 1in which : C0 =
( 1
0   1)
0
2(1   0)
;0 = 1     
1
   1
(B.29)
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